From our friends at Resolve:
Last week President Obama became the first world leader to issue a comprehensive strategy to address the LRA’s reign of terror across central Africa. It was a major step forward for efforts to achieve a lasting end to LRA atrocities, which include the murder and abduction of tens of thousands of people over the past two decades. And of course, it wouldn’t have happened without the tens of thousands of people who helped pass the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act back in May, which required President Obama to develop the strategy.
In the past week we’ve had a chance to take a deep breath, read the strategy (as many of you have also), and try to make sense of its significance and how it influences our work. So here goes. If you have additional questions, you can post them in the comments and we’ll respond.
First, as you may have noticed, the President’s strategy is less a detailed plan of action, and more a comprehensive framework to guide the future of United States action in the region. It lays out a clear vision that people in central Africa should be “free from the threat of LRA violence and have the freedom to pursue their livelihoods,” and four strategic goals which – in concert with each other – can achieve that vision: protection of vulnerable civilians, apprehension of Joseph Kony and other top LRA commanders, promotion of escape and reintegration of LRA abductees and fighters, and the provision of relief and recovery assistance to families disrupted by the violence.
However, much remains to be determined in how it will actually play out on the ground. We put together the following Q&A to help you understand the concrete role the strategy release plays in the process toward peace, and how it will shape our efforts moving forward.
1. What is the significance of this strategy?
We have reached a critical turning point in a long struggle. In simple terms, the U.S. president producing a strategy says to the world, ‘this matters.’ That’s huge. Protecting people from the kinds of horrific atrocities the LRA perpetrates is now a stated goal of our leaders and they have a plan of action to help make it happen that we can hold them to. This wasn’t the case for more than two decades, or in many previous situations of mass violence (think Rwanda). The strategy is no perfect solution, but it is a major step forward.
2. Right, that’s cool. But what does this actually do to help see LRA violence stopped?
Well, in the President’s own words, the strategy “provides an overarching, comprehensive strategic direction over several years to enhance these efforts and to increase the likelihood of success in mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA.”
That’s a fancy way of saying that the strategy is not a detailed plan of action, but an analysis of the problem and a framework for action that will guide increased United States engagement moving forward. Most details of what will actually change remain to be determined (and all of us will play a big role in determining them, but we’ll get to that in a moment). The strategy also rightly acknowledges that the United States is only one actor, and success also depends on leadership from regional governments, international bodies like the U.N., and the people affected by the crisis.
3. Ok, so it’s a framework and its impact will gradually be felt. Does anything change tomorrow?
The strategy includes a section called “Priority Actions.” This section spells out the most immediate priorities for implementation. Some are already in motion. Those priorities include building telecommunications infrastructure so that extremely remote communities have a way to tell the world when they are being attacked, assisting regional militaries and humanitarian agencies with mobility so they can respond more quickly, and strengthening efforts to rescue LRA abductees and help them escape.
4. I’m eating this up. Give me more substance on the strategy’s strengths and weaknesses!
Well, since you asked… We think the strategy’s strongest point is the way it acknowledges that an effective approach must include both military components (to help protect civilians and bring LRA commanders to justice) and non-military components (to help protect civilians, encourage the defection of LRA fighters, build communications infrastructure, and provide emergency assistance). It’s not an “either-or”, but a “both-and”, maximizing prospects for success. We also liked that it took a long-term view, reducing the chances the strategy becomes irrelevant if dynamics on the ground change slightly. Finally, we were encouraged that the strategy acknowledges the importance of political will from regional leaders and other partners in this effort. This is not “go it alone” problem-solving. Not even close.
But we also have some bones to pick with the strategy. They all relate somehow to the Ugandan military, which is currently taking the lead in regional efforts to pursue the LRA but has also been historically ineffective and complicit in some rights abuses. First, since the LRA is no longer operating within Uganda, the strategy acknowledges that the Ugandan military may eventually pull back, which would leave a security vacuum since the militaries of other affected countries are even less effective. Even recognizing the risks of relying on the Ugandans, the strategy doesn’t commit to building up alternatives (such as training for other forces, or increased deployments of peacekeepers).
Second, the strategy does not commit to finding more viable alternatives to the Ugandans if they continue to fail in their pursuit of Kony and other top commanders (such as better trained and better equipped specialized forces or new peacekeeping forces). Some alternatives may have been considered that are still classified, but we obviously don’t know. And third, the strategy doesn’t provide enough detail on how the U.S. will ensure its support to the Ugandan military is used for the right purposes or how it will ensure that the military behaves in the run-up to Uganda’s upcoming elections. We will be seeking clarification on each of these points in the coming weeks.
5. What will determine how robustly the strategy is implemented in the long-term?
Great question. The biggest factor: us. We made sure the law that required this strategy passed Congress. Similarly, all of us are a key “x-factor” in determining how effectively this strategy translates into impact on the ground. As we know, gaining and sustaining the attention of our leaders to such a faraway problem is enormously challenging, and that reality won’t change overnight with one new document from anyone, including the President. So our persistence is the key.
Our continued advocacy will be particularly crucial to squeezing money from Congress to implement the strategy. The President’s team can only do as much as they have money from Congress to do. Additionally, we’d like President Obama to task a senior diplomat and full-time team to work the issue, as the traditional bureaucracy is not effective at addressing such a cross-border crisis (especially in the face of other pressing priorities in the region such as Sudan’s upcoming independence referendum and violence in Congo’s Kivus region).
There are other areas that would help with implementing the strategy. We’ll all work together in the new year to advocate for those and continue to work to get this crisis the attention it deserves.
6. So, now we’ve passed a law and secured the first-ever United States strategy to address the crisis (BAM!). What next?
Well, before rushing headlong into our next phase, we will soon be announcing a way that we can all simply pause for a moment in the Christmas and holiday season to honor lives lost and disrupted in this tragedy. But then, come 2011, we’ll get to work full force ensuring the strategy becomes an plan of ACTION and results in concrete benefits for the communities enduring this horrific violence. We don’t intend to stop until there is an end to this, Africa’s longest-running war. We hope you’ll be with us.
- Michael & Paul
